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Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, inflation has 
become one of the major concerns in both industrialized 
and emerging economies. Friedman (1976) illustrated 
the negative impact of both high inflation and inflation 
volatility on economic performance. High inflation, 
for example, could reduce political cohesiveness since 
it overruns institutional arrangements and financial 
contracts based on a “normal” long-term price level. 
Higher price volatility, by increasing uncertainty, could 
lower economic efficiency and render market prices a 
less efficient system for coordinating economic activity. 
Because of all these negative effects on economic growth, 
central banks often consider inflation to be the greatest 
problem a country faces.
For Mexico, the empirical evidence concerning 
the negative impact of inflation on growth is somewhat 
mixed. For example, a recent study by Grier and Grier 
(2006) found that inflation uncertainty had had a negative 
and significant effect on Mexico’s output; moreover, 
higher average inflation rates had induced higher 
inflation uncertainty, further affecting growth. However, 
Risso and Sánchez (2009) argue that inflation has had a 
positive impact on growth as long as it has been below 
the threshold level of 9%. Inflation rates higher than this 
threshold have had a negative effect on growth.
By any reckoning, Mexico’s monetary policy over 
the past 25 years has been successful in achieving price 
stability: inflation declined from a monthly average 
rate of 4.3% during the 1980s to 0.4% during the early 
years of the twenty-first century. Mexico’s monetary 
authorities have used different monetary instruments 
to pursue price stability, ranging from exchange-rate 
controls to base money control to inflation targeting. 
To achieve its inflation targets, Banco de México1 has 
maintained a policy of controlling the amount of money 
available to commercial banks via the balances they 
hold with it, resulting in changes to domestic interest 
rates. Higher interest rates, for example, have resulted 
in contractions of aggregate demand that have lowered 
domestic inflation. Furthermore, in an open economy 
with high capital mobility and flexible exchange rates, 
higher domestic interest rates further lower the inflation 
rate via appreciation of the domestic currency: an 
1  Banco de México is Mexico’s central bank.
appreciated domestic currency not only restrains exports, 
but also lowers the domestic prices of imported goods 
and increases the prices of exportable goods.
Empirical studies of the neutrality of monetary 
policy in Mexico present conflicting evidence. For 
example, Mendoza (2003) found that Mexico did not 
have a long-run volatility trade-off between output and 
inflation, so that monetary policy affected only prices 
in the long run. Galindo and Ros (2005), on the other 
hand, found that monetary policy had had some impact 
on the real sector. 
Even though the negative impact of Mexico’s 
tight monetary policy on aggregate demand has been 
recognized,2 a thorough discussion of how this policy 
has affected the labour market has yet to take place. 
This is a major shortcoming of the current research 
agenda in Mexico because it means that the cost of 
achieving price stability in terms of workers’ welfare is 
overlooked. Even if we recognize that price stability is 
a necessary condition for economic growth in the long 
run, we should not overlook the short- and medium-run 
costs for workers’ well-being. 
We further explore the question of how responsive 
unemployment is to monetary policy in Mexico, a country 
that began its successful price stabilization programme 
during the second half of the 1980s. A related question 
is how permanent the impact of monetary policy on the 
unemployment rate is. 
The model used to carry out the empirical analysis 
rests on the assumption that money is non-neutral; that 
is, we contend that changes in unemployment rates can 
be partly explained by monetary policy implemented to 
control inflation. Our central argument is that by affecting 
aggregate demand and thus output, monetary policy 
has some impact on unemployment rates. Our analysis 
involves the estimation of a structural vector autoregression 
model (svar). Variance decomposition shows which 
shocks have caused movements in the variables during 
the sample period, while the impulse response functions 
contain information about the magnitude and duration 
of the effect of a specific structural shock. 
Another distinguishing feature of our analysis is 
that we consider both the official unemployment rate 
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and an alternative one based on the definition used 
by the Current Population Survey (cps) of the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use the latter 
as a response to some criticisms made of the official 
unemployment rate. 
Our results indicate that when the alternative 
unemployment rate is used, tightening monetary policy 
causes unemployment to increase with a characteristic 
hump-shaped pattern found in Alexius and Holmlund 
(2007) and Ravn and Simonelli (2008). The unemployment 
rate peaks after the second quarter at a level 0.26 points 
above its original level, and then slowly reverts back to 
that original level. Error variance decomposition results 
indicate that the monetary policy shock accounts for 3% 
to 27% of the fluctuation in unemployment. When we 
use the official unemployment rate, however, monetary 
policy shocks do not have much impact. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents 
a brief discussion of the non-neutrality of money and 
describes how monetary policy can affect unemployment. 
Section III reviews the monetary policies followed by 
the Mexican authorities during the period of analysis, 
while section IV presents some key characteristics of 
the Mexican labour market and introduces an alternative 
indicator of unemployment rates. Section V discusses the 
methodology used to carry out the empirical analysis, 
section VI presents the main empirical results, and 
section VII concludes. 
II
is money neutral?
Discussions about money neutrality can be traced back 
to Cantillon’s essay of 1775. His argument was that, 
under the gold standard, increases in the money supply 
would encourage higher spending, which in turn would 
stimulate production. This positive effect on production 
would be short-lived, however, for higher demand 
would also induce higher prices which, in turn, would 
have a negative impact on production. We find the same 
argument in Hume’s (1985) paper on money. His views 
were restated by Newcomb (1885) and Fisher (1911) 
and became what is now known as the quantity theory 
of money. 
The non-neutrality of money, on the other hand, is 
a key feature in Keynesian economics. Keynes’s view 
about the impact of money on real variables is found in 
his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
Central to his argument is the role played by domestic 
interest rates in inducing changes to aggregate demand. 
In the Keynesian framework, the rate of interest is the 
reward for parting with liquidity. To the extent that the 
interest rate affects the marginal efficiency of capital, 
which in turn determines investment, changes in the 
quantity of money will affect output and employment. 
The overall impact on aggregate demand is further 
strengthened by the responsiveness of consumption to 
changes in investment. In Keynes’s view, the interest 
rate depends partly on the state of liquidity preferences 
and partly on the quantity of money, so that changes 
in the quantity of money will induce changes in the 
interest rate, ceteris paribus. Chick (1983), in turn, 
argues that interest rates will be affected by open market 
operations or by variations in banks’ reserves or reserve 
requirements designed to affect liquidity or the supply 
of credit, or both. 
Given the capacity of interest rates to affect output 
and thus unemployment, the monetary authority can 
use monetary policy to induce changes in the domestic 
interest rate in order to achieve certain specific goals. 
If, for instance, inflation is assumed to be caused by 
excess demand, then higher interest rates can be used 
to control inflation via the contraction of aggregate 
demand. Moreover, in an open economy with high capital 
mobility, higher interest rates will induce appreciation 
of the domestic currency, which will not only restrain 
price increases but also further reduce aggregate demand. 
Taylor (1994), on the other hand, has suggested that 
the monetary authority’s efforts to keep prices stable may 
also cause production to fluctuate more, while attempts 
to smooth the production cycle may induce higher price 
volatility. To reduce price volatility, monetary policy 
would have to be biased even more towards restraining 
aggregate demand. 
In general, there is a consensus about the non-
neutrality of money in the short run. Recently, however, 
there has been a growing debate about the long-run 
impact of monetary policy on the real sector. Blanchard 
(2003), for instance, contends that money is non-neutral 
and that monetary policy can have large and long-lasting 
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effects on real interest rates and, by implication, on 
unemployment. There are three possible channels of 
transmission for this. One could be the effect of the real 
interest rate on current unemployment. The longer a spell 
of unemployment is, the likelier the unemployed are to 
lose their skills. Therefore, sustained high unemployment 
will lead to an increase in the natural rate itself. A second 
possible channel is capital accumulation: the real interest 
rate affects the cost of capital, the cost of capital affects 
capital accumulation and capital accumulation affects the 
demand for labour and thus unemployment. Therefore, 
a sustained increase in real interest rates leads first to 
an increase in the actual unemployment rate and later, 
as capital accumulation decreases, to an increase in the 
natural rate. The third potential mechanism might be the 
effect of the real interest rate on a firm’s mark-up. To 
the extent that this had a direct impact on employment, 
unemployment would be affected by monetary policy 
through this mechanism.3
The theory of long-run neutrality of money predicts 
that tight monetary policy will not affect the growth path; 
yet Schettkat and Sun (2008) illustrate that in Europe, for 
example, monetary policy has been asymmetrical because 
of central banks’ fear of inflation. They present evidence 
that this asymmetry has lowered long-run trend growth 
3  There is a fourth potential mechanism which falls within the real 
business cycle approach: the labour supply depends on interest rates. 
This is an area that has not yet been investigated for less developed 
economies. 
in some European economies.4 This result is borne out 
by other studies that have also found evidence against 
long-run money neutrality. 
To some extent, this asymmetry of monetary policy 
is an intrinsic feature of inflation targeting. Studies of 
the impact of asymmetric monetary policy on output in 
less developed economies are uncommon. One of the 
few that do exist is Galindo and Ros (2005). They argue 
that monetary policy in Mexico has been biased towards 
exchange-rate appreciation since inflation targeting 
began, i.e. the central bank has responded only when 
the exchange rate has been undervalued, not when the 
real exchange rate has been overvalued. Furthermore, 
the negative impact of real exchange-rate appreciation 
on output means that monetary policy (or inflation 
targeting) has restrained economic growth in Mexico. 
A conclusion we can draw from this review is that 
there are strong theoretical arguments for expecting not 
only short-run non-neutrality but long-run non-neutrality 
as well. The question then becomes whether monetary 
policy has had a short- and long-term impact on Mexican 
unemployment. In the next section we briefly describe 
the monetary and fiscal policies implemented in Mexico 
during the period from 1987 to 2004. 
4  Schettkat and Sun (2008) give the following account. An external 
negative shock pushes the economy into a recession which is not 
fully counteracted by monetary policy. During the upswing, fearing 
inflation, the central bank does not fully accommodate the recovery. 
As a result, the economy will not swing back to its original growth 
path but will remain below it. 
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Our analysis begins in 1987, in the midst of a period 
characterized by high macroeconomic instability. 
During that time, Mexico’s monetary policy had the 
twin objective of promoting economic growth with 
price stability (Garriga, 2010). A distinguishing feature 
of this monetary policy was that it attempted to control 
inflation through exchange-rate stability. Messmacher 
and Werner (2002) argue that the Mexican authorities 
used multiple instruments to control inflation, with 
fiscal instruments being prominent alongside exchange 
controls. In addition, the government introduced a 
temporary wage freeze and price controls as part of an 
Economic Solidarity Pact.
The use of these instruments is explained by the 
assumption that inflation was mainly caused by fiscal 
deficits which pushed aggregate demand above aggregate 
supply. In this context, excess demand was seen not only 
as inducing higher domestic prices but also as leading to 
current account deficits. External deficits, in turn, would 
create pressure for devaluation of the exchange rate, 
which could further exacerbate inflation (Garriga, 2010). 
As most of the price and wage controls were gradually 
lifted, the anti-inflation programme evolved into a more 
orthodox strategy in which fiscal adjustment and an 
exchange-rate anchor became the main policy elements. 
Between 1988 and 1994, the Mexican authorities made 
several modifications to the exchange-rate system, with the 
dual and fixed system being replaced by a pre-announced 
rate of devaluation (where the rate of devaluation was set 
below the rate of inflation). In November 1991, Mexico’s 
central bank implemented a narrow exchange-rate band 
with a sliding ceiling (Messmacher and Werner, 2002). 
Between 1992 and October 1993, the nominal exchange 
rate was remarkably stable. In December 1993, Mexico’s 
Congress granted the central bank operational autonomy 
and established that its only objective was to preserve 
the stability of the purchasing power of money. This 
replaced the twin objectives it had had until then. 
Throughout most of this period, Mexico’s managed 
exchange-rate regime was supported by prudent fiscal 
policy. Indeed, the country moved from a fiscal deficit 
of 12.5% of gross domestic product (gdp) in 1988 to a 
fiscal surplus in 1992 (Garriga, 2010). After 18 months, 
this combination of policies yielded the expected results: 
inflation fell drastically to less than 20% annually. From 
then on, though, the pace of disinflation became sluggish. 
Sánchez (2005) maintains that between 1988 and 
1994, the amount of credit going to the private sector 
grew significantly, at annual rates of about 30%. The 
absence of an adequate supervisory and regulatory 
framework, compounded by poor accounting standards 
and insufficient recognition of past loans falling due, 
among other things, meant that this lending explosion 
negatively affected the profitability of the banking 
system. Combined with a lack of consistency between 
monetary and exchange-rate policies, the problems of 
the banking system precipitated a very serious crisis at 
the end of 1994. 
In December 1994, faced with a serious balance-
of-payments and financial crisis, the central bank was 
no longer able to defend the predetermined United 
States dollar-peso parity and so allowed the peso to 
float. The peso immediately depreciated and domestic 
prices increased steadily, rising at a monthly rate of 3.6% 
throughout 1995. The interbank interest rate increased 
from 17% in the third week of August 1994 to 110% in 
the third week of March 1995, which induced a severe 
slump in the real economy. Output and employment 
suffered considerably: output fell by 6.2%, while open 
unemployment was up to 7.6% by mid-1995. Sánchez 
(2005) states that the recession and unemployment 
caused by the financial crisis were the worst since the 
Great Depression. 
The new strategy achieved price stability indirectly, 
since it sought to modify agents’ expectations as well 
as interest rates and the exchange rate. Because these 
elements affect aggregate demand, the central bank 
was able to determine the future behaviour of inflation 
(Díaz de León and Greenham, 2000). To induce changes 
in domestic interest rates, the central bank decreed 
changes in the cumulative monthly balance held with 
it by commercial banks (the corto).5 In the monetary 
authorities’ view, inflation was a problem caused by 
excess demand.6 Therefore, unexpected increases in 
5  On 21 January 2008 the central bank adopted the overnight interbank 
rate as its operating target, replacing the measure used hitherto, which 
was the balance in commercial banks’ current accounts held with the 
central bank.
6   Garriga (2010) goes further and argues that the new monetary 
authorities did not believe in the existence of a trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation. 
III
Monetary and fiscal policies in Mexico
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actual inflation or inflation expectations were dealt with 
by reducing the corto, thereby inducing commercial 
banks to bid up interest rates. 
The evolution of monetary policy since the adoption 
of the floating exchange-rate regime has included the 
following main elements. First, adoption of quantitative 
objectives based on aggregates such as the monetary 
base, predominant during 1995-1997. Second, in 
early 1998 the central bank announced a change in its 
strategy: it began targeting inflation. In particular, the 
1999 monetary programme set an annual inflation goal 
of no more than 13% for the National Consumer Price 
Index and proposed, as a commitment for the next five 
years, a gradual convergence with the inflation rate of 
the country’s main trading partners. In 2001, the goal of 
monetary policy was to stabilize the National Consumer 
Price Index at 3%. However, in mid-2002 the central 
bank announced that this commitment would have a 
margin of tolerance of ±1 percentage point. 
Castellanos (2000) also shows that changes in the 
corto have had a strong impact on the entire interest 
rate structure and argues that the impact is strongest for 
short-term interest rates. The magnitude of this effect has 
changed over time, and since June 1998 it has been more 
unstable. In point of fact, Gaytán and González (2006) 
found that there had been a change in the transmission 
mechanisms of monetary policy as a result of inflation 
targeting. They argued that exchange-rate fluctuations 
were having a smaller effect on price formation, the 
formation of inflation expectations and nominal interest 
rates, while changes in nominal interest rates had been 
more effective in influencing the real exchange rate 
and inflation. 
To summarize, in this section we have described 
the monetary policy used by Mexico’s central bank to 
control inflation. The instruments used have varied over 
time. During the early years, exchange-rate and price 
controls were used intensively. Then a fixed exchange 
rate was replaced by a floating rate to give the central 
bank the freedom to control monetary aggregates and 
interest rates, or both. During this second stage, interest 
rates were the predominant instrument used to control 
inflation. To the extent that both interest rates and 
exchange rates affect output and thus employment, we 
contend that monetary policy has the potential to have 
a significant impact on unemployment. 
IV
the Mexican labour market 
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we describe 
key characteristics of Mexico’s labour market with a 
view to providing a better understanding of employment 
dynamics and the way unemployment might respond to 
policy shocks. Second, in the light of some criticisms 
made of the official unemployment rate, we estimate an 
alternative unemployment rate and use it to assess the 
impact of monetary policy. 
1. the nature of the Mexican labour market
There are two contrasting views of the nature of the 
Mexican labour market. On the one hand, there is the 
idea that it is heavily regulated by laws that impede job 
creation (Heckman and Pagés, 2001; Gill and others, 
2001). In this view, output growth does not translate into 
employment growth but rather into real wage changes. 
It is argued that job security provisions (which include 
severance payments) increase dismissal costs for firms. 
These costs discourage firms from dismissing workers 
whenever there is a negative shock and reduce job 
creation in upturns. Heckman and Pagés (2001) found 
that Mexico exhibited one of the highest indices of job 
security in Latin America, which implies that it has one 
of the most regulated markets in the region. 
Employment rigidity can also be increased by the 
existence of labour unions. Maloney (2009), for example, 
argues that Mexican unions value employment over wages, 
so that output fluctuations affect wage rates more than 
employment. This can be explained by several factors. 
First, Mexico has no unemployment insurance; hence, 
workers value employment stability more than wages. 
Second, since the early twentieth century the major unions 
have had a close and long-standing relationship with 
the government and have cooperated in implementing 
policies to reduce inflationary pressures. In particular, 
since the late 1980s unions have settled, on average, 
for nominal wage growth below inflation. Third, job 
growth was slow relative to population growth during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. These elements explain 
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why output fluctuations are correlated more with real 
wage fluctuations than with employment changes. They 
might also explain Alcaraz’s conclusion that real wages 
do not depend on unemployment in the formal sector 
(Alcaraz, 2009). 
On the other side of the debate, there is the argument 
that even though Mexico’s labour market is heavily 
regulated by employment laws, in practice compliance 
with such laws is very limited. Moreover, a number of 
schemes introduced since the late 1980s have increased 
employment flexibility (Marshall, 2004). Among these 
schemes we find the increased use of short-term contracts 
to avoid the inflexibility of permanent employment. This 
is particularly true of the maquila and service sectors, 
the fastest-growing sectors in the Mexican economy 
since the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, Alcaraz and others (2008) contend 
that the employment share of the service sector has 
increased at the expense of Mexico’s manufacturing 
employment since 2000. According to these authors, this 
recomposition of employment has entailed not only an 
increase in the service sector’s employment share but 
an expansion of the informal sector as well. The upward 
trend of employment in the informal sector has occurred 
despite the wage differential between formal and informal 
employment. They also find evidence that the rate of 
transition between formal and informal employment 
is higher than that between manufacturing and service 
sectors. They point out that higher mobility between 
the formal and informal sectors (and vice versa) would 
indicate the existence of institutional labour market 
rigidities in Mexico’s formal sector.
The existence of a large informal sector7 somewhat 
offsets the employment rigidities caused by labour 
regulations in the formal sector. The question is whether 
or not this offsetting force is strong enough for us to 
be able to characterize the Mexican labour market as 
being fairly flexible. 
In short, two types of factors coexist within Mexico’s 
labour market. On the one hand, there are some labour 
market institutions that increase employment rigidity 
while also increasing real wage flexibility; namely, 
labour regulation and unions. On the other hand, we 
find elements that offset the negative effect of these on 
employment flexibility, including weak enforcement of 
labour regulations and the existence of the informal sector. 
A priori, we do not know which of these two types of 
factors has a stronger effect on employment flexibility. 
7  Alcaraz (2009) argues that the informal sector may represent as 
much 40% of the Mexican labour force.
2. How accurate are Mexico’s  
unemployment figures? 
To an outsider, Mexico’s low official unemployment rates 
represent a puzzle. How could a country with such low 
rates of unemployment grow so little? At about 3.5%, 
Mexico’s unemployment rate over the last 20 years or 
so has been on average one of the lowest among the 
members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (oecd), with only Luxembourg and 
the Republic of Korea presenting lower rates.8 Yet its 
average annual rate of per capita gdp growth has been 
1.2%, far lower than the 5.8% reported by the Republic 
of Korea, which has similar unemployment rates.9 
Several authors have argued that Mexico’s low 
official unemployment rates can be explained by a 
combination of several elements, namely: (i) the lack 
of unemployment benefits, (ii) the existence of a large, 
fairly well-remunerated informal sector, (iii) high rates 
of labour migration to the United States, and (iv) the 
exclusion of rural areas when unemployment rates are 
estimated, as unemployment is higher there than in 
urban areas. 
Our contention, however, is that although some of 
these factors might partially account for the low rates of 
unemployment in Mexico, a more significant explanation 
can be sought in some methodological issues relating 
to the estimation of unemployment rates. Fleck and 
Sorentino (1994) and Martin (2000), for example, argue 
that if the concepts and methodology used by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics are followed, Mexican 
unemployment rates increase by between 40% and 70%. 
Revenga and Riboud (1993) reach the same conclusion, 
although for a different reason: the official statistics do not 
take into account the temporarily unemployed, or those 
who are unemployed but not included in the surveys.10
To tackle one of the main criticisms of the official 
statistics, we re-estimated Mexico’s unemployment rate 
using the quarterly National Survey of Urban Employment 
(eneu) and following the cps criteria. First, we considered 
8  oecd members averaged a rate of 5.93% between 1987 and 2004 
(http://stats.oecd.org). 
9  Between 1987 and 2004, Mexico’s total real gdp grew at an annual 
average rate of 3.01%, while its population grew by an average of 
1.8% a year. The Republic of Korea, on the other hand, grew at an 
annual rate of 6.2%, while its population growth was 0.33% during the 
same period (output data are from the oecd website http://stats.oecd.
org, while data on population growth come from World Population 
Prospects: The 2006 revision, United Nations, 2007, table A.8).
10  This is particularly relevant when a person is unemployed and not 
seeking work at the time of one survey but then finds a job before the 
next survey is carried out and thus features as employed. 
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only workers between the ages of 16 and 75.11 Second, 
to obtain the overall unemployment rate, we used only 
the original 16 cities included in the eneu. Third, we 
did not treat as employed those who were on strike or 
laid off because of shortages of working capital or raw 
materials or a lack of repairs. We also excluded people 
working without pay for up to 15 hours a week. That is, 
they were not categorized as part of the economically 
active population (eap) or as employed. The resulting 
series allows Mexico’s unemployment rates to be compared 
directly to those of the oecd countries.
The evolution of official and alternative unemployment 
rates is displayed in figure 1. Compared to the official 
rates, the alternative measure is about 100% higher, 
i.e. the average rate of unemployment for the 1987-
11  Prior to 2005, Mexican statistics covered people working from the 
age of 12. In response to criticisms, the lower age limit was raised 
to 14 in 2005. 
2004 period goes up from 3.4% to 6.4%. The overall 
behaviour of the two series, however, is fairly similar. 
The main difference is seen during the period prior to 
the 1995 crisis. In the early 1990s, both series show a 
slight upward trend which peaks by the end of 1995. The 
unemployment rate begins to decline rapidly in 1996, 
bottoming out by the end of 2000 in both series. This 
improvement is short-lived, however, for in the next 
year unemployment begins to trend upward again. Both 
unemployment series exhibit large cyclical fluctuations 
as well as short-run variations. 
In the previous section we described the main 
monetary and fiscal policies followed in 1987-2003. We 
argued that the main objective of both sets of policies 
was to control inflation. To do this, however, the central 
bank needed to restrain aggregate demand, which in 
turn resulted in a contraction of output and thus in an 
expansion of unemployment. The econometric technique 
used in this analysis is presented below. 
FIGURE 1








1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Ofcial Alternative
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Geography (inegi), National Survey of Urban Employment (eneu), various years.
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We use a structural vector autoregression model (svar) 
to analyse the dynamic impact of monetary policy on 
unemployment. It should be noted that another way to 
perform the analysis is through the use of a Markov-
switching vector autoregression model. Given the 
small sample size of our data set, however, the degrees 
of freedom would have been quickly eroded, which is 
why we did not carry out an analysis of that type. Our 
analysis is complemented by estimation of the impulse 
response function and variance decomposition. 
Thus,
 AXt = B(L)Xt-1 + εt (1)
where Xt is an (nx1) vector of endogenous variables; 
A is an (nxn) matrix of coefficients describing the 
contemporaneous correlation among the variables; B(L) 
is an (nxn) matrix of polynomials in the lag operator, 
L; and εt is an (nx1) vector of structural shocks. Thus, 
each of the system’s variables can be influenced by its 
own idiosyncratic shocks and by shocks from the other 
variables. The matrices A and B(L) determine how shocks 
to each variable are transmitted through the system, 
both contemporaneously and in subsequent periods. The 
reduced form of the svar can be expressed by: 
 Xt = A
-1 B(L)Xt-1 + A
-1 εt = C(L)Xt-1 + et (2)
where et = A
-1 εt describes the relationship between 
the model’s reduced and structural shocks. In fact, the 
model’s reduced shocks are linear combinations of the 
pure structural shocks.
A necessary condition for establishing the 
relationships between the reduced and structural shocks 
is that the system be identified. As is well known, to 
identify the structural model from an estimated var, 
it is necessary to impose (n2 – n)/2 restrictions on the 
structural model. 
Several different methods of identification are 
available in the literature on svars. Blanchard and 
Diamond (1989) use a priori assumptions about the 
signs of structural parameters to identify the range of 
values of matrix A that are consistent with the data. 
Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) use assumptions about long-run multipliers to 
achieve identification. Blanchard and Quah (1989) start 
with orthogonal shocks. In a two-variable model, one 
is assumed to represent a supply shock and the other 
a demand shock. For example, productivity shocks are 
separated from demand shocks by assuming that demand 
shocks do not affect real output in the long run while 
productivity shocks do. On the other hand, Sims (1980) 
argues that identification is achieved using short-run 
restrictions on the timing of the effects of shocks only, 
i.e. monetary policy shocks are frequently identified by 
assuming that changes in the interest rate do not affect 
inflation in the same period because prices are sticky and 
respond with a delay. In our analysis, we follow Sims’ 
(1980) approach to identify our model. 
1. Definition of variables and data 
Our svar includes the following variables: unemployment 
rates, the output gap (since demand for labour is a derived 
demand that depends on the fluctuations of output), and 
an indicator of monetary policy. We also include three 
variables that are thought to affect Mexican unemployment: 
United States output, an indicator of fiscal policy, and 
labour productivity. The inclusion of these variables in 
our analysis is justified below.
Our sample period covers both fixed and floating 
exchange-rate regimes. Under a fixed exchange-rate 
system, central banks lose the freedom to determine 
their monetary policy, while with floating exchange rates 
they gain control over monetary policy and can use it 
to attain their specific goals. With a floating exchange 
rate, moreover, interest rates and the exchange rate 
become interdependent on each other. The effects they 
have on output and thus unemployment operate through 
different mechanisms. Instead of using exchange rates 
and interest rates independently as instruments for 
measuring monetary policy, we use a composite index 
of monetary policy. Specifically, we use the Monetary 
Conditions Index (mci), which captures the total effect 
(direct and indirect) of the exchange rate and the interest 
rate on domestic output. 
The mci is typically measured as the weighted sum 
of changes in the short-term interest rate and exchange 
rate relative to a base period, with the weights being 
generally derived from empirical econometric models 
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output or inflation.12 Thus, the mci determines the extent 
of tightening or loosening of monetary conditions in an 
economy by capturing deviations in these two variables 
from the base period. Accordingly, lower interest rates 
drive looser or more expansionary monetary conditions 
and higher rates denote tighter conditions, which may 
also be achieved through domestic currency appreciation 
or a combination of both measures. 
In our work, we use the mci as an indicator of policy 
stance. For instance, the mci calculated relative to a base 
period indicates whether policy has become tighter or 
looser relative to that base period. In this construct, the 
absolute value of the mci does not provide the basis for 
any meaningful interpretation; rather it is the direction 
of movement which reveals the change in policy stance. 
Using the estimated coefficients of the interest-rate and 
exchange-rate variables in the cointegration vector of 
the aggregated output system, the ratio or weight of the 
mci index turns out to be 1:4.2, which indicates that the 
exchange rate has a larger impact on aggregate output 
than interest rate effects.13 
We define the output gap as the difference between 
observed output and potential output, and we assume 
that potential output is best characterized as being driven 
by a stochastic process and can be obtained using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter.14 Thus, the domestic output gap 
is y~ = (y – y*), where y* is the permanent component of 
output, y being observed real gdp.
Insofar as Mexico’s stabilization programme 
included the reduction of fiscal deficits, we need to control 
12  We derived the relative weights of the interest rate and exchange 
rate for the mci from an aggregate demand equation. The literature 
has suggested three approaches to estimating relative weights: (i) the 
single equation approach, involving estimation of either an output or 
a price equation; (ii) the trade share approach, involving estimation of 
an equation for the ratio of long-run exports to gdp; (iii) the multiple 
equation approach, involving estimation of the system of equations 
through cointegration. We used vector autoregressive (var) and 
Johansen cointegration models to avoid omitted variable bias, dynamic 
exogeneity and feedback problems. The cointegration approach takes 
care of these problems. 
13  Recent empirical studies have shown that there has been a change 
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy since 2001 as a 
consequence of the new anti-inflation strategy based on inflation 
targeting. Gaytán and González (2006) argue that output and inflation 
have become more sensitive to interest rates, whereas the real exchange 
rate has become less important. Our results differ somewhat because 
our period of analysis goes back to 1987, when the exchange rate 
was the nominal anchor. In fact, the nominal exchange rate was the 
predominant instrument until 1994. 
14  Choosing a large λ in the Hodrick-Prescott filter implies the view 
that supply shocks are deterministic and that variations in output come 
almost entirely from demand shocks. Choosing a very small λ implies 
the view that most variations in output are also variations in potential 
or trend output and hence are driven by supply shocks. 
for the impact of fiscal policy on unemployment. We 
therefore introduced the structural primary surplus into 
our model. The structural primary surplus is calculated 
as the difference between the observed deficit and the 
cyclical deficit. The structural deficit, in other words, 
is the government deficit adjusted for business cycles 
measured as the ratio of potential output to actual output. 
Following Pastor and Villagómez (2007), we adjust the 
government deficit for business cycle fluctuations.15 
This adjustment is made by multiplying tax revenues 
by the ratio of potential gdp to actual gdp, raised to the 
power of the elasticity of tax revenues to actual gdp. 
To construct the structural primary surplus, budgetary 
data obtained from the Ministry of Finance and Public 
Credit were used. 
Several studies have shown the high degree to 
which Mexican business cycles are co-dependent upon 
those of the United States. This finding is self-evident, 
given that more than 90% of exports go to the United 
States economy. To control for the impact of this on 
unemployment in Mexico, we include the United States 
output gap, q~, as the indicator of foreign demand in our 
model. Thus, q~ = (q – q* ), where q* is potential United 
States output, estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
and q is observed United States output. 
Finally, we also include a proxy for technical 
change. It has been argued that labour-saving technical 
change can affect unemployment rates, and to control 
for such changes in technical efficiency we introduce 
labour productivity into our model as an exogenous 
variable. Labour productivity is measured as output per 
employed worker.
We use available quarterly data from the first quarter 
of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 2004, giving a total of 74 
observations. The Mexican output gap is estimated from 
real gdp, obtained from the National Institute of Statistics 
and Geography (inegi), while the United States output 
gap is calculated from United States real gdp as obtained 
from the main oecd economic indicators. The indicator 
of Mexico’s fiscal policy is the fiscal surplus, while the 
indicator of labour productivity is output per worker. 
We use both the official and the alternative 
unemployment series, both of them seasonally adjusted 
using tramo-seats. By the same token, the Mexican and 
15  According to Hayford (2005) the logic behind structural measures 
is that “One problem in identifying the effect of fiscal policy [...] is that 
government revenues and transfer payments respond to fluctuations in 
economic activity as well as potentially cause fluctuation in economic 
activity. One way to deal with this problem is to control for the effect 
of cyclical fluctuations by using cyclically adjusted or structural 
measures of fiscal policy.”
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foreign output gaps were obtained using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with λ = 1600, following seasonal adjustment 
using tramo-seats. 
2. identification
The svar model includes three endogenous variables: 
monetary policy (mci), the domestic output gap (y~) and 
unemployment (u), and three exogenous variables: the 
United States output gap (q~), productivity (p) and fiscal 
policy (g). These last three variables were tested for 
exogeneity following Hyeon-Seung (2005). We found 
that χ2 (48)=37.007[0.87].16 
The order of matrix A is as follows. Monetary policy 
is shown first, followed by excess domestic demand and 
then the unemployment rate. Monetary policy is identified 
by assuming that changes in the interest rate do not 
affect excess demand in the same period because prices 
are sticky and respond with a delay. This implies that 
α21 = 0. Given the existence of a large informal sector 
and the high degree of transition between formal and 
informal employment (see section IV, subsection 1), 
unemployment rates will not necessarily change as output 
changes. Output fluctuations will induce flows between 
the formal and informal sectors, so the unemployment 
rate will remain fairly rigid. This translates into 
16  Values in parentheses refer to the degree of freedom and those in 
square brackets are the marginal significance levels of the test. 
α32 = 0. It is important to note that labour market rigidity 
is not posited on strict labour legislation preventing 
output fluctuations from affecting unemployment. 
Instead, rigidity is posited on the existence of a large 
informal sector and high labour mobility between the 
formal and informal sectors so that unemployment is 
not affected contemporaneously by output fluctuations. 
It is paradoxical that, in Mexico, labour rigidity results 
from the existence of a labour market that is very flexible 
indeed.17
The third restriction is derived from the fact that 
monetary policy does not depend on unemployment, 
i.e. α13 = 0.
17  Calderon-Madrid (2000), Alcaraz and others (2008) and Alcaraz 
(2009) present some evidence for the high degree of labour mobility 
between the formal and informal labour markets. The existence of 
a large informal labour market that is closely intertwined with the 
formal one means that output fluctuations do not necessarily translate 
into fluctuations in unemployment, or vice versa. In other words, the 
existence of a large informal labour market indicates that the relationship 
between the cyclical components of output and unemployment is not 
necessarily linear or contemporaneous. Instead, we might observe that 
a given change in output will induce higher labour mobility between 
the formal and informal sectors so that the unemployment rate remains 
constant. Consider, for example, that if employment is decomposed 
into its formal (ef) and informal (ei) components, then the following 
should be true: u = 1 – ef – ei . That is, variations in unemployment 
will ensue only if formal and informal employment move in the same 
direction, which in reality does not occur. Thus, the impact of output 
variations on unemployment will be fairly low unless the informal 
sector lacks the requisite flexibility. This holds true even in the face of 
the institutional rigidities mentioned by Heckman and Pagés (2001).
VI
Empirical analysis
In this section, we present the estimates of the parameters 
and carry out some complementary analyses such as 
impulse response analysis and analysis of variance. We 
also conduct tests to verify the robustness of our results.
1. svar estimation
Since the primary interest in the svar analysis is to 
determine the relationship between the variables and not 
the parameter estimates in themselves, we follow the 
recommendation of Sims (1980) and Sims, Stock and 
Watson (1990) against differencing even if the variables 
contain a unit root. Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) argue 
that transforming the model into a stationary form is in 
many cases unnecessary, for the real issue is whether 
the estimated coefficient or test statistics of interest 
have a distribution that is non-standard when in fact 
the regressors are integrated. However, we have added 
some deterministic components in a way that yields a 
stationary var.
Thus, given that both unemployment series (the 
official one and the alternative one) are non-stationary over 
the sample period,18 and since we want to determine the 
18  See table A.2, which includes the unit root tests. We use the Lee 
and Strazicich (2003) minimum Lagrange multiplier unit root test 
with two structural breaks. 
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persistence of monetary policy shocks rather than assume 
that the effects are permanent, we added a deterministic 
time trend to the model to yield a stationary svar and 
also a stationary unemployment rate. To the extent that 
monetary policy might be affected by expected inflation, 
we added this to the svar. We used lagged inflation as 
a proxy for expected inflation. While lagged inflation 
was statistically significant only in the mci equation, 
including this variable did not have any qualitative 
effect on the rest of the results. The econometric results 
are shown in the appendix (see table A.1). Our analysis 
is therefore based on a parsimonious model without 
expected inflation. 
Before estimating our svar model, we tested the 
identification restrictions (α21 = α32 = α13 = 0.). The 
likelihood ratio test was 0.003 and was not significant 
when contrasted with critical values of the chi-square 
distribution with three degree of freedom; accordingly, 
the joint hypothesis could not be rejected. The optimal 
lag length was derived using the Akaike information 
criterion (aic) and the Bayesian information criterion 
(bic), leading to a choice of two lags. When the official 
unemployment rate was used, the estimated svar 
coefficients were either statistically insignificant or had 
the wrong signs. In fact, the initial impact of a monetary 
shock was a reduction of the unemployment rate, a result 
that is clearly contrary to economic theory.19 
Table 1 reports the svar coefficients estimated 
using the alternative unemployment series. As we can 
see, there are no signs of misspecification in any of the 
equations. Table 1 contains the sum of coefficients on 
the two lags of each variable and the Wald test for their 
joint significance; p-values are in parentheses. The 
results are as expected; a tight monetary policy increases 
unemployment and decreases domestic demand. Higher 
domestic demand decreases unemployment. A fiscal 
surplus decreases domestic demand, while the impact on 
 
19  In figure 3 we compare the results of the impulse response functions 




























































Adjusted (R2) 0.834  0.811 0.837
Log likelihood -339.93
Portmanteau (12) 105.1633 (0.1311)
Source: authors’ estimates.
Note: The table contains the sum of the coefficients on the two lags of each variable. Wald test for joint significance of both lags of each 
variable. The portmanteau joint test for white noise residuals is shown.
mci: Monetary Conditions Index.
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unemployment has the right sign but is not significant. 
United States output shocks decrease unemployment and 
increase domestic demand, while productivity shocks 
increase domestic demand. 
2. impulse response functions
Since we are particularly interested in the effects of 
monetary policy shocks on the unemployment rate, 
figure 2.A shows the dynamic response of unemployment 
to an exogenous tightening of monetary policy, along with 
its percentile bands. The results show that unemployment 
responds positively to positive monetary policy shocks, 
indicating that an exogenous monetary policy tightening 
of 1% induces an increase of 0.26 percentage points 
in unemployment after two quarters. After five years, 
unemployment is still 0.06 percentage points higher 
than it would have been without the shock. As this is a 
stationary var, all shocks are temporary but monetary 
policy itself is persistent, so the shock dies away only 
gradually. In response to the tight monetary policy, 
unemployment increases with a characteristic hump-
shaped pattern like the one found by other studies.20 It 
peaks after three quarters before slowly reverting back 
to its original level. 
20   See, for example, Alexius and Holmlund (2008) and Ravn and 
Simonelli (2008). 
Our results indicate that unemployment in the 
labour market adjusts more quickly in Mexico than in 
Sweden, where Alexius and Holmlund (2008) estimated 
that a monetary policy shock had its maximum effect on 
unemployment after nine quarters. In a study evaluating 
the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment 
in the United States economy, Ravn and Simonelli 
(2008) found that half the peak effect of such a shock 
on unemployment had disappeared after 10 quarters and 
none remained after 10 years. 
Hence, the effect of an exogenous tightening of 
monetary policy on unemployment is less persistent 
in Mexico than in Sweden and somewhat similar to 
the effect in the United States economy. The speed 
of the adjustment can be put down to the existence of 
a large informal sector and of a number of schemes 
that have added some employment flexibility despite 
heavy regulation in the Mexican formal labour market. 
Labour regulation and labour unions, on the other hand, 
might explain the low elasticity of employment in the 
presence of policy shocks. Our results are consistent 
with previous findings in Latin America.21 Unlike those 
studies, however, this one contends that the existence 
of a large informal sector and a growing service sector 
could explain the speed of adjustment found.
21  See, for example, Loboguerrero and Panizza (2007) and González-
Anaya (2002).
FIGURE 2.A
response of unemployment to a monetary policy shock












Note: Response to a temporary one standard deviation shock in monetary policy. Confidence bands computed by Monte Carlo integration. 
Following Sims and Zha (1999), we compute percentile bands. 
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Figure 2.B shows that a contractionary monetary 
shock has a negative effect on excess domestic demand. 
The effect peaks after the first quarter, as compared to 
the second quarter in the case of unemployment. Half of 
the peak effect has disappeared by the end of the seventh 
quarter. These results are statistically significant and 
different from zero. Much as in the case of unemployment, 
the estimated impulse response of excess domestic demand 
reverts back to zero after six years. This result indicates 
that output falls when monetary policy is restrictive, 
which is logical since real interest rates affect the cost 
of capital and thus consumption and investment. 
In short, the results indicate that an exogenous 
tightening of monetary policy will increase unemployment 
while driving output below its potential level. 
3. variance decomposition
Next, we examine the forecast error variance. The forecast 
error variance decomposition tells us the proportion of 
the movement in a sequence that is due to its own shocks 
as opposed to shocks to the other variables. Table 2 
reports the forecast error variance decomposition at the 
1, 10, 20 and 30 quarter horizons. We are interested in 
ascertaining what share of unemployment fluctuations is 
due to monetary policy shocks and to domestic demand 
shocks (first row). The results indicate that monetary 
policy shocks account for 1% to 26% of fluctuations 
in unemployment, depending on the time horizon. 
Excess domestic demand shocks account for about 
5% in the short run, while the share falls to 4% over a 
FIGURE 2.B
response of the output gap to a monetary policy shock










Note: Response to a temporary one standard deviation shock in monetary policy. Confidence bands computed by Monte Carlo integration. 




1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30
Ln(u) 93.35 71.71 69.71 69.50 5.47 4.28 4.40 4.42 1.17 23.99 25.80 26.07
y~ 0.00 9.07 11.17 11.40 100 59.34 56.08 55.73 0.00 31.57 32.71 32.85
mci 0.00 5.02 6.92 6.88 0.72 4.94 5.04 5.04 99.27 90.02 88.26 88.06
Source: authors’ estimates.
Note: The figures in the second row are horizons (i.e. quarters); all other figures are estimates rounded to two decimal places, so rounding 
errors may sometimes prevent perfect percentage decomposition.
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longer horizon. We can observe that, in the short run, 
unemployment is explained by its own innovation to 
the extent of about 93%, a share that falls to 69% over 
a longer horizon. 
4. robustness
Given that the svar is estimated on a number of specific 
assumptions, we investigated the robustness of our 
results to different sets of assumptions. We estimated 
four additional models in addition to our baseline 
model. Model 2, for example, includes as a measure 
of monetary policy an mci with derivations of relative 
weights for interest rates and exchange rates using a trade 
share approach by estimating an equation for the ratio 
of long-run exports to gdp. Model 3 is a svar model 
with three lags. This is because, according to the aic 
and bic criteria, there are arguments in favour of two 
or three lags. In our baseline model we settled for the 
more parsimonious model specification, i.e. two lags.
In model 4 we drop the assumption that unemployment 
is not affected by output and let the coefficient be 
determined by the model, assuming instead that 
monetary policy does not respond contemporaneously to 
excess demand ( α12 = 0). We maintain the assumption 
that monetary shocks do not affect excess demand 
contemporaneously ( α21 = 0) and that unemployment 
does not affect monetary policy contemporaneously (α13 
= 0). Models 1 to 4 are estimated using the alternative 
unemployment rate. Model 5, on the other hand, is 
the baseline model using the official rate of open 
unemployment. 
Figure 3 shows the impulse response function 
of unemployment to monetary policy shocks for all 
five models. Except for model 5, the results are quite 
robust, with the effects peaking after two quarters. 
The magnitude of the maximum effect varies between 
0.26 and 0.50 percentage points when the response is 
calculated for a monetary policy shock of one standard 
deviation. As already noted, coefficients estimated using 
the official unemployment rate are not consistent with 
economic theory.
Another interesting feature of this comparative 
analysis is that, five years after the initial shock, 
unemployment is between 0.004 and 0.12 percentage 
point higher that it would have been without the shock. 
Figure 3 also indicates that when we drop the assumption 
that Mexico’s labour market is rigid, the effect of monetary 
policy on unemployment is even higher (model 4). The 
higher estimated persistence can also be attributed to the 
restriction we imposed of monetary policy not responding 
contemporaneously to the economy. The model with the 
lowest estimated persistence is the one we assume to 
have three lags (model 3).
FIGURE 3
impulse response functions of the five models




















MCI with constant coefcientsBaseline Lag 3
Ofcial unemployment Structural 2
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Notes: Model 1 = baseline; model 2 = mci with constant coefficients; model 3 = lag 3; model 4 = structural 2; model 5 = official unemployment.
198
mExICo: WhAT IS ThE ImPACT of monETARy PoLICy on UnEmPLoymEnT RATES?  •  ALEJAndRo ISLAS C. And WILLy WALTER CoRTEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 2
Table 3 reports the forecast error variance 
decomposition of all five different models at a 1, 10, 
20 and 30 quarter horizon. As we may observe, the share 
of monetary policy shocks in the variance decomposition 
of unemployment is quite robust at the 10, 20 and 30 
quarter horizon for models 1 to 4. The results indicate 
that monetary policy shocks account for 21% at the 
longer horizon in a model with three lags, as compared 
to 26% in our baseline model. 
Model 5, the one based on the official rate of 
unemployment, deserves special attention. Our results 
suggest that an exogenous tightening of monetary 
policy (shock) of one percentage point would induce 
a 0.15 percentage point drop in unemployment 
contemporaneously, and that the effect would then 
peak after four quarters. The estimated impulse 
response returns to zero after two and a half years. The 
variance decomposition analysis indicates that official 
unemployment rates are exogenous with respect to 
monetary policy shocks. At this point we do not have a 
clear explanation for this result, and can only suggest 
further exploration.
TABLE 3
variance decomposition for the different models
Ln(u) y~ mci
1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30 1 10 20 30
Model 1 93.35 71.71 69.71 69.50 5.47 4.28 4.40 4.42 1.17 23.99 25.80 26.07
Model 2 90.45 67.35 65.63 65.05 5.88 6.10 6.92 6.95 3.65 26.03 27.43 27.54
Model 3 97.87 74.45 74.55 74.55 1.21 3.61 3.99 3.99 0.95 21.93 21.45 21.44
Model 4 38.88 28.82 27.58 27.45 60.33 48.60 48.08 48.03 0.77 22.57 24.32 24.50
Model 5 88.61 92.14 92.51 92.51 9.28 5.54 5.31 5.30 2.10 2.29 2.17 2.17
Source: authors’ estimates.
Note: The figures in the second row are horizons (i.e. quarters); all other figures are estimates rounded to two decimal places, so rounding 
errors may sometimes prevent perfect percentage decomposition.





We have estimated the impact of macroeconomic 
stabilization policies on Mexican unemployment rates. 
The analysis has been carried out for two series of 
unemployment rates (the official rate and an alternative 
rate estimated following the methodology used by the 
cps of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics) and 
for different model specifications. 
When official unemployment rates are used, the 
impulse response function indicates that monetary policy 
shocks induce an initial drop of about 0.15 percentage 
points in unemployment. This quickly increases to 
0.18 percentage points by the fourth quarter. However, 
unemployment then returns to its initial level by the tenth 
quarter; that is, official unemployment rates suggest that 
the Mexican labour market is very fluid. 
When the alternative unemployment rate is used, our 
results indicate that monetary policy is non-neutral in the 
short and medium terms. We tested the robustness of our 
findings under different sets of assumptions. We conclude 
that our results do not depend on a particular assumption. 
For example, we find the same qualitative result when 
we assume a rigid labour market as when we assume a 
flexible one. The impulse response functions suggest that 
the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment 
falls by between 0.26 and 0.50 percentage points under 
different sets of assumptions. Another important result is 
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that five years on from the initial shock, unemployment 
is between 0.004 and 0.12 percentage points higher than 
it would have been without the shock. We did not find 
evidence for a long-term impact of monetary policy on 
unemployment in any case. 
Variance decomposition analysis complements the 
impulse response function findings. While the models 
based on our alternative measure of unemployment 
suggest that monetary policy can explain up to 27% 
of overall variance, the model based on the official 
unemployment rate indicates that monetary policy can only 
explain up to 2.2% of total variations in unemployment. 
Obviously, these results represent a puzzle that needs 
further investigation. 
Our estimates of the elasticity of unemployment 
to monetary shocks suggest that their effect is rather 
small. However, adjustment to such shocks is faster than 
in European countries, for example. The low impact 
of monetary policy can be explained by the existence 
of some institutional rigidity; namely, intrusive labour 
regulation and labour unions. These rigidities impede a 
fuller adjustment to policy shocks. However, there are 
other elements within the labour market that allow a 
relatively quick adjustment to such shocks to take place. 
Among these elements, we consider the existence of a 
large informal sector and a growing service sector where 




































































Adjusted (R2) 0.831 0.809 0.869
Log likelihood –331.18
Portmanteau (12) 107.1656 (0.1411)
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Note: The table contains the sum of the coefficients on the two lags of each variable. Wald test for joint significance of both lags of each 
variable. The portmanteau joint test for white noise residuals is shown. 
mci: Monetary Conditions Index.
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TABLE A.2
the endogenous two-break Lagrange multiplier unit root test
Official unemployment. Model C: K=1, TB1
 = 1995:1, TB2
 = 1999:3, N = 72, λ1, ≅ 0.4, λ 2, ≅ 0.7
Critical values 5% (-5.67) tØ = 2.769
Parameter µ d1 dt1
d2 dt2 φ
Estimator -0.294 1.515  0.058 0.364 0.233 -0.217
T-statistics -2.349*  5.030*  0.392 1.206 2.272* -2.769
Alternative unemployment. Model C: K=1, TB1
 = 1995:1, TB2
 = 1999:3, N = 72, λ1, ≅ 0.4, tØ, = –5.452 
Critical values 5% (-5.67) t0 = –5.452
Parameter µ d1 dt1
d2 dt2 φ
Estimator -0.574 1.874 0.383 0.487 0.808 -0.6412
T-statistics -3.583* 3.062* 1.622** 0.797 3.761* -5.452
Source: authors’ estimates. 
Note: * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10%, respectively.
Null: yt = µ0 + d1B1t + dt1
D1t + d2B2t + dt2
D2t + yt–1 + v1t
Alternative: yt = µ1 + γt + d1D1t + dt1
DT1t + d2D2t + dt2
DT2t + v2t
where Djt = 1 for t ≥ TBj + 1, j = 1,2 and 0 otherwise; DTjt = t – TBj for t ≥ TBj + 1, j = 1,2 and 0 otherwise; Bjt = 1 for t ≥ TBj + 1, j = 1,2 
and 0 otherwise and TBj denotes time period when a break occurs.
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